<<Print>>

It is time for the New Patriotic Party (NPP) to look within itself for the reasons for losing two elections on the trot. In this exercise, it will be useful for the party to listen carefully to Dr. Kobina Arthur Kennedy, one of its leading lights who has done some work on the NPP�s loses. In his book �Chasing the Elephant into the Bush�, Dr. Kennedy discusses some of the reasons for the NPP losing the 2008 elections. Excerpts of the book are reproduced below; While it may be impolitic to say so, there are good policies that do not make good politics at particular times. It is reported that in early 1933, a distinguished group of economists made some recommendations to President Roosevelt. After listening to what they had to say, the President said �You guys know more about economics than I will ever know but I know more about politics than you will ever know. What you are recommending may be sound economics but it is not sound politics. Therefore, I will not do it.� We failed to reduce adequately and in a timely manner the price of fuel which would have helped many Ghanaians. Also in this category was the failure to deal with the controversy surrounding pre-mix fuel in the fishing communities along our coat. In Kumasi and Accra, city� officials expelled traders from market-stalls and streets malls without any alternative arrangements in place and thus cost us crucial support amongst these groups. Also alienated were commercial drivers who were given draconian fines for trivial offenses. On the other hand, the construction of the Jubilee House and the purchase of Presidential jet in an election year portrayed the NPP and the Kufuor administration as pre-occupied with priorities not important to ordinary people. This gave credence to opposition charges that the NPP was an uncaring government. Then we compounded it all by forcing eighth of our best Ministers to resign because they were running for President and then sacking our National Security Co-ordinator/Minster, Francis Poku in an election year! Many believed that the Security problems we had in the period leading to and during the elections would have been better handled by a team led by Francis Poku. This is not to criticize Dr. Amo Ghartey. He is an excellent professional but many feel he needed a bit of time in the saddle before facing the challenges of election-year. Of our government�s failures, perhaps the most significant were the failure to provide adequate security, to our own polling station agents in the Volta Region and elsewhere and by implication, the Electoral Commission. PARTY LAPSES Third, our parry, despite its glorious past, was a pale shadow of itself. It lacked, on the ground, the vital structures that in the past had brought us victory. Polling station executives had ceased to function; constituency executives were more interested in chasing money than chasing votes and campaign had been reduced, for most people into celebrity events in which one want to be seen rather than to campaign for votes. The end result was that while the NDC were going door-to-door, we were deriding them instead of going person-to-person ourselves. Fourth, our campaign made too many mistakes. People spent too much time putting one another down instead of working to defeat the NDC. People with critical information were excluded or not consulted about things where their knowledge was crucial to success. Examples of these have been given in the course of this book. There was too much emphasis on the candidate with the result that all of us wanted to follow him regardless of where we were truly needed. The result was that our candidate was overworked while others just looked on. While the NDC had three teams in the field, despite having enough talent to field six, we had one for most of the campaign and finally two for the last month or so. We did not use our candidate�s time well. Due to poor planning, our candidate spent too much time in certain regions where not much could be gained and too little time in places where his presence could have made a difference. For example, if the NPP candidate had spent more time in the Eastern Region or Greater Accra instead of the Volta Region, it would have made a decisive difference. In Eastern Region, the candidate�s home region, he underperformed president Kufuor by a whopping 64 thousand votes in the December 7th poll. In communication, the NDC made propaganda a key part of their campaign while we talked, but never committed the necessary resources to counter their propaganda. Week after week, we agreed to commit more resources but did not. USING PRESIDENT KUFUOR This point has already been made but it bears emphasizing. As late as September of 2008, President Kufuor was more popular than either candidate running and yet, he did not get involved in the public phase of the campaign. There is no doubt that having the President on the campaign trail from September onwards in Central, Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo and Western Region would have made a significant difference. This was rather reminiscent of the 2000 US elections when the failure to get President Clinton involved had cost Democratic candidate Al Gore Arkansas and with that the Presidency. RELATIONSHIP WITH SMALLER PARTIES Also, our failure to nurture our relationship with the smaller parties over the last eight years also came to bear in that over the preceding eight years, these parties had moved, almost imperceptibly, from being our natural allies to being our natural opponents. Therefore, most of them, with the exception of the DFP, worked to help the NDC. SUPPORT OF CORE CONSTITUENCIES We lost the support of teachers and security personnel. While their numbers in electoral terms are not significant, these two groups are crucial to electoral success. Most of the Electoral Commissions temporary Election workers are teachers and as we approached the elections, a lot of teachers were unhappy with arrears and being made to forfeit pay for going on strike. As one teacher who was an election official remarked afterwards, �we taught the NPP a lesson�. In the NDC strategic document prepared in 2006, they made reaching out to security forces a key task. There is speculation that the reluctance of security forces to secure the vote in the Volta Region and to secure the environment in Tain for a fair vote may have reflected the NDC�s success in wooing them. NDC CAMPAIGN While it is true that the NPP lost this election, the NDC, apart from election-day ways and means, at which they excelled, did other things well too. They had a clear strategy on how to deploy their big guns and they followed it well. They had a clear propaganda strategy and they followed it and put resources behind it. They exploited our government�s election-year blunders ruthlessly, and in the process, lied recklessly wherever it served their interests. PERSONAL MISTAKES Many have asked whether there are things I would do differently and the answer is yes. First, I assumed wrongly that given the importance of communications, enough resources and attention would be allocated to it. I was wrong. I should have been more aggressive in fighting for resources and space for my committee. I should have disregarded the campaigns injunctions not to seek outside help for my committee sooner. Second, I was urged repeatedly to spend more time following the candidate. I was wrong in not heeding that advice. I realized during the second round that in the candidate�s travelling entourage, my committee had not had a strong voice in the early parts of the campaign. Having the system we had in the second round, which involved having me on the road with the candidate and with daily conferences with Jake and Oboshie in Accra would have served the campaign very well.